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Abstract: Using illustrations from the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and their aftermath, this 
paper argues that understanding popular music and public discourses about it can help to 
understand the dynamics of ethnopolitical conflict. Studies of war and conflict have 
approached music as political communication, as an object of securitization, as a means of 
violence, and as a symbol of ethnic difference, while international law in the context of 
another case of collective violence, Rwanda, has even begun to question whether performing 
or broadcasting certain music could constitute incitement to genocide. Drawing on post- 
structuralist perspectives on the media and ethnicization in conflicts, this paper explores and 
interrogates the discourse of popular music as a weapon of war that was in use during and 
after the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Music during the Yugoslav wars was used as a tool 
of humiliation and violence in prison camps, was used to provoke fear of the ethnic Other in 
line with a strategy of ethnic cleansing and was conceptualized as a morale asset for the 
troops of one’s own side. A discourse of music as a weapon of war was also in use and 
persisted after the war, when its referent was shifted to associate music-as-a-weapon not to 
the brave and defiant in-group so much as the aggressive Other. This was then turned against 
a wider range of signifiers than those who had directly supported the Other’s troops and had 
the effect of perpetuating ethnic separation and obstructing the re-formation of a (post- 
)Yugoslav cultural space. Despite evidence that music did serve as an instrument of violence 
in the Yugoslav wars and the precedent of the Bikindi indictment, the paper concludes that 
music should be integrated into understandings of ethnopolitical conflict not through a 
framework of incitement and complicity but with respect for the significance of music in the 
everyday. 
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Music and nationalism are intimately connected. In the hands of nationalist movements and 
governments, music has been a powerful means of representing the cultural identities of 
nations to co-nationals and others, from the folk revival movements of the nineteenth century 
through to the ‘nation-branding’ strategies of today. The practice of attaching a national 
anthem to the nation, and to its state where it has one, ties music to the nation on a worldwide 
scale. Music is also significant in mobilising social groups to take action in the name of the 
nation, such as in the efforts made by musicians, scholars and publishers to collect folk songs 
into national rather than just regional repertoires and to demonstrate that ethnic collectivity 
exists regardless of political borders. The uses of music are of course not only textual but also 
participatory, as it accompanies many types of occasion where nationhood is constituted by 
the nation’s members on the level of everyday practice.2 
When considering conflicts that have been framed in nationalist or ethnopolitical terms, 
however, an understanding of music must go beyond these observations about music and 
nationalism to take in the idea that music can also be used as a tool of conflict in its own right 
– in short, that music can operate as a weapon. While this potential has not been studied to  
the same extent as the link between music and nationalism in general, several authors 
including Martin Cloonan, Bruce Johnson and Suzanne Cusick have explored it in the past 
decade, through examples including the use of music as a torture method in US detention 
facilities during the War on Terror.
3 
Notably, the prosecution at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda also attempted to introduce this principle into international criminal 
justice by indicting the Rwandan musician Simon Bikindi on the grounds that his songs about 
the history of inter-ethnic relations in Rwanda had amounted to incitement to genocide when 
re-used during the violence in April–July 1994.4 There are thus increasing moves both inside 
and outside the academy to take music seriously not just as a representation of violent   
conflict but also as a direct instrument through which that violence may take place. 
This paper seeks to explore the question of music as a weapon of nationalist and 
ethnopolitical conflict further through the case study of the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. 
Cloonan and Johnson’s study of popular music and violence incorporates some references to 
the use of music in the abuse of prisoners during the war in Croatia which have been drawn 
from the ethnomusicological research of Svanibor Pettan: it is now possible to extend these 
observations through sources that have become more recently available, such as prisoner 
testimonies from the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia.
5 
Beyond the 
direct use of music while inflicting physical pain that is evident in cases such as these, 
however, there is a further sense in which music can also be considered an instrument of 
violence and that should also be discussed: if, as post-structuralist approaches to 
ethnopolitical conflict claim, the goal of ethnopolitical conflict is to fix and harden ethnic 
separation so that one side’s territorial objectives can be permanently achieved, then the full 
range of techniques used to achieve this separation should also be thought of as tools of 
conflict. This paper will show how music could be said to have had this function during the 
post-Yugoslav wars, but also approaches the discourse of music as a weapon of war critically: 
in the aftermath of the wars themselves, there is evidence that this discourse itself became an 
instrument of prolonging ethnic separation, when applied to the music of the opponent rather 
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than the music of one’s own group and used against musicians who had not been personally 
implicated in violence. The paper therefore concludes with a note of caution as regards over- 
extending the concept of music as a tool of ethnopolitical conflict. First, however, it is 
necessary to review how the dynamics of ethnopolitical conflict should be understood, 
including the process of ‘ethnicization’, and how this manifested in the post-Yugoslav wars. 
 
Ethnopolitical conflict and the Yugoslav wars 
 
Ethnopolitical movements in conflict seek to secure and control territory in order to  
exercising power within its boundaries. This principle of ‘territoriality’ applies to all states 
and aspiring states;
6 
what ethnopolitical movements seek to do with their territory is to apply 
the principle of nationalism, a belief ‘that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent’.7 Yet disputed territories and populations are far more ambiguous than this ideal. 
Making them match requires the revision of international borders, human settlement patterns 
or both so that nation-states are inhabited by their ethnic majorities, with minorities 
minimized. Behind this notion must lie a deeper belief that the majority and minorities can be 
differentiated: a precondition for ethnopolitical movements, let alone conflict, is the 
constitution of each group as identifiable and essentially different from its neighbours.
8
 
Post-structuralists argue that this constitution is contingent and dependent on a range of 
processes, including calling ‘groupness’ into being through speech that evokes the existence 
and character of speakers’ own groups and Others.9 The ‘ethnicization’ of social life or 
conflict then appears as a matter of framing and ‘social struggles to label, interpret or explain’ 
events, including violence.
10 
To achieve this framing, ethnopolitical actors must therefore be 
able: to depict and construct a fixed ethnic group; to present an opposing Other for this group 
to be defined against; and, as a means of raising stakes, to promote a belief that group 
members will be in danger from the Other unless they cast their lot with their own group. 
Ethnopolitics is thus inherently a politics of fear and threat. 
Although ethnic cleansing – forcibly removing people from territory to ethnically 
homogenize territory claimed by an ethnopolitical movement – acquired its English-language 
name during the post-Yugoslav wars, its use in nation-state formation arguably has a longer 
history.
11 
In ethnic cleansing, direct violence in one location is intended to have a wider  
ripple effect: perpetrators hope that, over a broader radius, other members of the target group 
/ others who must first be made to regard themselves as members of the target group will 
leave their own homes in fear of suffering the same brutality if they stay. Ethnopolitical 
conflict thus depends on instilling and maintaining fear of the Other, representing its identity 
as alien and its violence as barbaric, and forcing a radical and violent revision of everyday 
relations.
12
 
From this perspective, the post- Yugoslav wars may be viewed as a political project in 
which elites competing for control over the collapsing Yugoslav socialist state’s resources 
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invoked nationalism as the source of legitimacy and sovereignty for the successor states they 
intended to create by (para-)military means.
13 
These actors, claiming to represent peoples, 
took advantage of a wave of historical revisionism that had followed Tito’s death in 1980 in 
order to mobilize their own populations around collective identities based on war memory, 
ethnic nationalism and fear of the enemy Other.
14 
The logic of deriving sovereignty from 
bounded ethnically-homogenous territories led to the practice of committing collective 
murder, robbery and rape to terrify wider populations of undesired minorities into fleeing the 
spaces identified as ethnic homelands. However, this was only one strand of the project to 
forcibly break up Yugoslavia; the motivators of war also needed to have unravelled the 
everyday ambiguity of Yugoslav life in order for that ethnic logic to make sense. Behind the 
front lines, and even on them, this reordering of the community around homogenous, 
unambiguous ethnic belonging was played out through news and also entertainment media, 
including popular music. The linked conflicts in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
had the intention and effect of destroying pre-war Yugoslavia as a meaningful political and 
sociocultural framework. 
Ethnomusicologists studying this period have already identified the significance of music 
as a symbol of ethnic difference during and after Yugoslavia’s disintegration. This position 
rests on a constructivist theory of ethnicity that views ethnic identities as defined not by a list 
of ethnic characteristics but through symbols that mark people and collectivities as ethnically 
similar or different, i.e. that establish ethnic boundaries.
15 
Musical genres, texts and practices 
may act as such ‘boundary markers’, all the more powerfully for being grounded in everyday 
life. Naila Ceribašić was among the first ethnomusicologists to argue that popular music 
became a means of differentiation between discourses and states in former Yugoslavia, 
including contrasts between certain musical instruments that were used to symbolize the  
Serbs and Croats as distinct ethnocultural groups; Ivan Čolović’s influential text on the 
construction of ethnic Others during the wars also discusses music.
16 
Mirjana Laušević shows 
labelling and categorization at work in the construction of distinct ‘Serb’, ‘Croat’ and 
‘Muslim’/‘Bosniak’ song styles during the Bosnian conflict, highlighting this ethnic 
labelling’s contingent, processual nature.17 Understanding the symbolic and social 
construction of ethnicity makes it clear that popular music in this ethnopolitical conflict 
situation was deliberately used as a means of constituting and reifying the ethnic groups that 
were imagined to be collective actors, perpetrators and victims in the Yugoslav wars. 
 
Music and the outbreak of conflict 
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Popular music in Yugoslavia had formed part of the state commemorative calendar and 
become one layer in a rich Yugoslav cultural space that would arguably even outlive the 
Yugoslav state.
18 
However, the Yugoslav regime had also treated music as a security threat 
where it expressed substate nationalism, emphasized ethnonational historical narratives that 
did not fit within Yugoslavia’s official narrative, promoted religious devotion, or, of course, 
related to one of the nationally-defined groups that had opposed Tito’s Partisans during the 
Second World War,
19 
the Serb royalist Četniks and the Croat ultranationalist/Fascist Ustaše.20 
The Yugoslav authorities preferred musicians and editors to exercise self-censorship but, if 
this failed, would take action themselves. The emblematic case was the Croatian singer Vice 
Vukov who, during a period of political liberalization, had associated himself with the 
Croatian mass movement of 1968–71 through his patriotic song ‘Tvoja zemlja’ (‘Your land’). 
Being abroad, he avoided arrest when the movement was shut down, but could not work as a 
musician in Yugoslavia again until 1989.
21 
Some other Croatian musicians claimed similar  
but less extreme treatment.
22 
In everyday life, each Yugoslav republic’s criminal code 
contained provisions that could be used for criminalizing substate-nationalist songs. These 
were directed against obvious provocation as well as political conviction: in 1987, the funk 
singer Dino Dvornik had been told not to mention Croatia on stage and so mischievously 
improvised a couplet ‘Op la la, ja sam mali ustaša’ (‘Op la la, I’m a little Ustaša’). He  
received a 90-day prison service that he avoided by activating personal connections.
23 
By the 
time Yugoslavia broke up, however, the musicians involved in the first wave of Croatian 
nationalist/patriotic music-making in 1989–90 did not seriously fear imprisonment or 
employment bans, even though Croatia’s state-owned record company took some more 
months to become comfortable with it. 
This background is important for understanding the use of music by the actors in the post- 
Yugoslav ethnopolitical conflict. On one hand, broadcasters and politicians were already 
accustomed to using popular music for collectivist ends; on another, secessionists used 
Yugoslavia’s suppression of Croatian nationalist music as evidence that the Yugoslav system 
had been designed by Croats’ ancient enemies, the Serbs, to prevent Croats exercising self- 
determination. Nationalist/patriotic music-making could thus be presented as an expression of 
freedom and democracy in line with developments elsewhere in Central Europe in 1989–91, 
creating a discourse of music as an instrument of liberation. 
This discourse was carried into the armed conflict phase itself and was combined with the 
Croatian state’s official communications strategy of presenting itself as a modern European 
democracy appealing for peace. Early wartime hits directly appealed to the European 
Community to stop the Yugoslav Army’s brutal aggression. For domestic consumption, this 
aggressor was represented in more detail as a tripartite Other, Yugoslav and Communist and 
Serb; under the discursive parameters of the Croatian president and the heads of state 
broadcasting, the Croat ethno-nation could not contain signifiers of any of these. Although 
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one would overlook the pluralism and voluntarism of the many musicians who responded in 
song to the attacks on Croatia if one regarded them as no more than state functionaries, the 
state broadcaster still exercised powerful control over what music would be most widely 
disseminated and therefore had a filtering effect. 
The wartime Croatian state’s representational strategy for popular music, however,  
clashed with music’s historic military function as a source of troop and civilian morale. 
Music-making, including frequent performances by Croatian stars at the front line, was also 
supposed to exemplify and promote national defiance.
24 
A state television music editor 
explained that his programming policy, responding to events in the war, selected songs based 
on their lyrics plus some musicians’ regional connections to sites under attack.25 Partly 
incorporated into the rolling news framework that dominated Croatian broadcasting in late 
1991, music editors had to operate within the broadcaster’s macro-guidelines for depicting  
the conflict (controversially, journalists were prevented from showing weeping or wounded 
bodies although many desired to do so
26
) and also silenced songs they considered too 
aggressive. Over-aggressive songs circulated instead through cassettes, market-stalls and 
local radio, but the boundary for over-aggressiveness was not fixed. Sometimes songs were 
playlisted then dropped, or different branches of the state media viewed a song differently. 
The editor above had included the song ‘Hrvatine’ (‘hyper-Croats’) in his morale-boosting 
repertoire, but it would later be de-playlisted because it called the enemy ‘beasts of evil’ 
(‘zvijeri zle’) and because two other phrases echoed Ustaša slogans. 
The ‘Hrvatine’ controversy illustrates the contestedness of ‘aggression’. Silencing any 
Croatian aggressiveness in combat (or behind the lines), ‘aggression’ was shifted entirely on 
to the enemy ethnic Other. ‘The Serb aggressor’, in Croat and Bosniak nationalist discourses, 
is emphasized as the one responsible for violence and for forcing ‘us’ to fight despite ‘our’ 
peaceful natures. ‘Our’ soldiers, who could never be aggressive, were ‘defenders’.27 The 
requirement to silence aggression yet represent a defiant defence created a curious lacuna in 
public representations of the war: how else would troops be defending if not through violence? 
In Croatia, the tension between sanitization and mobilization in war representations appeared  
to have been overcome when a soldier and amateur musician, Marko Perković Thompson, 
became famous in early 1992 through a song pledging vengeance against the Serbs and 
‘Četniks’ who had attacked his home village (under the 1991 news guidelines, the term 
‘Četniks’ was not even to be used). Yet media use of his output was still subject to 
negotiation – the Croatian broadcaster refused to make a video for another song with an 
‘over-aggressive’ script that Thompson proposed in 1994.28 It is perhaps significant that 
Thompson’s celebration in state media only began after Croatia had been internationally 
recognized as a state and depictions of its soldiers’ violence could cause less harm to its 
legitimacy. 
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A discourse of music as a weapon was widespread during the post-Yugoslav wars. Carol   
Lilly and Jill Irvine quote the headline (‘My rifle [is] my song’) of an interview with one 
female vocalist, Severina, as evidence of how Croatian women were expected to complement 
the masculine military contribution to the war through equal yet separate contributions.
29 
However, the song-as-weapon construction could also be applied to male musicians, perhaps 
as a device for retaining masculinity though not serving in combat: ‘My bullet is my song’, 
stated Duka Čaić, the composer/performer of ‘Hrvatine’, ‘and it wounds the Četniks more 
than the calibre of a long gun [kalibra duge desetke]’.30 Beyond this, music also functioned 
more directly as a tool of conflict. As in many torture situations, forced singing of nationalist 
songs was used in prison camps during the post-Yugoslav wars to humiliate ‘enemy’ 
prisoners, as has been described in a number of prisoner testimonies at the ICTY. The 
significance of these testimonies as evidence is that the prosecutors and witness found it 
relevant to present forced singing to the tribunal as a means of torture, and judges in some 
cases have themselves stated that evidence of forced singing was salient in reaching their 
verdict. Among the transcripts’ limitations, however, is the fact that the transcripts tend not to 
specify which songs were sung, since only the songs’ genre needed to be stated in order to 
support the allegation of persecution on an ethnic basis. 
At the ICTY trial of four Serb defendants accused by the ICTY of ethnic cleansing in the 
Bosnian town of Bosanski Šamac in 1992, for instance, one Bosniak held prisoner testified 
that Serb guards had forced them to sing Četnik songs while his brother was being beaten: 
 
The rest of the prisoners were standing in the room and singing the Chetnik songs  
they were ordered to sing. […] While I was singing those songs, when I saw my 
brother's hand, which was swelling rapidly, I gestured to the other detainees who were 
there with us, asking them to sing louder, and I took my brother's hand and pulled his 
fingers, crying all the time. (Muhamed Bičić)31 
 
The judges found ‘that the forced singing of Serbian songs based on discriminatory grounds 
was an act of humiliation’ against non-Serb prisoners, and that its sound outside the prison 
building were one reason a co-defendant, Blagoje Šimić, must have been aware of the abuses 
inside.
32
 
Forced singing was also reported as a torture method in other trials. The trials of Dario 
Kordić/Marko Čerkez and Mladen Naletilić/Vinko Martinović, two sets of Bosnian Croat 
commanders, heard that Bosnian Croat guards under their eventual command had forced 
Bosniak prisoners to sing Ustaša songs during the HVO/ABiH conflict in 1993. An 
anonymous witness from Mostar testified that the HVO had arrested men with Bosniak  
names and taken them to a camp outside town where they were often woken at night and 
forced to run a gauntlet of guards while singing ‘the Croatian [national] anthem, [and] some 
Ustasa songs dating back to World War II’.33 Sometimes the humiliation consisted of 
prisoners being forced to sing songs corresponding to their own ethnicity instead, as in the 
testimony of Vil Karlović, a Croatian volunteer who had been captured by Serb soldiers from 
the hospital in Vukovar in November 1991: 
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The man who was biggest built, Belgija, he held me and forced me to sing Croatian 
songs and took me from [the temporary prison camp at] Velepromet along a road 
which was near the railway line, and some 100 metres on a vehicle arrived and we all 
got into it.
34
 
 
Events in Vukovar presented many examples of music being used and understood as a direct 
form of aggression by both sides. Most infamous was a song improvised by Četnik 
paramilitaries during the fall of Vukovar and recorded by foreign reporters: ‘Slobodane, šalji 
nam salate / biće mesa, biće mesa, klaćemo Hrvate’ (‘Slobodan [Milošević], send us salad / 
there’s going to be meat, we’re going to kill the Croats’). Emil Cakalić, also captured from 
the Vukovar hospital, spoke of this song’s psychological effect during the trial of the Serb 
Radical Party leader Vojislav Šešelj: 
 
I know this first thing, ‘Slobo, Slobo, send us,’ et cetera, et cetera, but they were fairly 
brutal. They were very unpleasant. And as soon as people heard them coming, they 
would run and hide, go off the streets. And the people were very much afraid 
generally, both Croats and the Serbs, because the Serbs wouldn't have been spared 
either had this unruly crowd started doing what it intended to do. […] [T]he song 
resounded throughout Vukovar, especially by the volunteers who were singing it.
35
 
 
Serb forces in Vukovar went on to use music in a more organised way. During the occupation, 
musicians from Serbia including Nada Topčagić visited Vukovar for a concert at the Vuteks 
factory where they performed nationalist songs to Serb soldiers and civilians.
36 
Serbian 
television footage of the concert, uploaded to YouTube in 2012, shows Topčagić entering the 
factory hall and performing the Serb patriotic song ‘Marširala kralja Petra garda’ (‘King  
Petar’s guard was marching’), which refers to a parade in Belgrade during the reign of King 
Petar II of Yugoslavia (1934–45).37 
Yet music had also been used in Vukovar to accomplish Croat, as well as Serb, 
ethnonational purposes. An anonymous witness at the Vukovar Hospital trial who had lived 
in Vukovar until July 1991 testified that hearing Croat nationalist songs describing violence 
against Serbs had increased the fear felt by himself and his family. Importantly, singing had 
been concurrent with other acts he believed preparatory to direct violence: 
 
You can hear some shooting at night, especially after the 2nd of May [1991] when 
that attack on Borovo Selo happened. You could hear Croatian soldiers singing some 
national songs about the killings of Serbs, and – they were all close by to us, and we 
didn't feel safe anymore. My mom was called so many times. My stepdad was called 
so many times to leave Vukovar because he lives with a Chetnik. They barged one 
day into our house, and they took all the weapons that he had. He used to be a 
hunter.
38
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Music, Johnson and Cloonan argue, may affect the mind and body differently from other 
communicative forms: for instance, setting words to music makes them more memorable.
39 
Mirjana Laušević reported a Bosniak refugee from Mostar had been ‘so haunted by’ one 
HVO song that ‘she found herself humming it, even though that same Croatian Military 
Defense [Council] had imprisoned her husband, stolen her livestock, and destroyed her 
house’.40 Since ethnic cleansing itself is supposed to have a lasting, indirect effect, music 
would certainly appeal as a tool if it stayed with the hearer longer than the spoken word. 
Directed against one’s own population, music could also be a tool to disengage an opposition: 
Eric Gordy thus argues that the Milošević regime’s promotion of pop-folk or ‘turbo-folk’ 
music in the mid-1990s was designed to hinder rock bands performing and being heard as  
part of an attack on the spaces of sociability used by Serbia’s ‘alternative’ opposition.41 
The Vuteks factory concert, and the presentation of Croatian musicians in Croatia’s 
wartime media, both show that musicians were conceptualized as morale assets during the 
Yugoslav conflict. ‘Deploying’ musicians as morale-workers is of course a widespread 
military practice: armed forces have traditionally operated their own bands but also hired 
civilian entertainers to provide recreation for troops. During the Croatian wave of patriotic 
volunteerism in autumn 1991, many entertainers were organized into ensembles who 
performed for front-line units and were regularly photographed in uniform: though some  
male musicians (and reportedly one woman) spent weeks or months in combat, the state 
clearly used musicians as a category as figures rather than as troops. Musicians associated 
with other ethnopolitical groups participated in similar ways. In 1994, Lepa Brena (one of 
pre-war Yugoslavia’s most famous celebrities) visited Bosnian Serb troops in her hometown, 
Brčko, wearing a camouflage-patterned outfit including a cap with the Bosnian Serb flag. In 
2009–10, Brena gave her first post-war performances in BiH and Zagreb, but groups of 
Croatian Army and ABiH veterans described her as not fit to perform because in 1994 she  
had worn Bosnian Serb uniform.
42 
This reaction equated the complicity of an enemy civilian 
musician with that of an enemy soldier. The practice of militarizing musicians into ‘artistic 
units’ (as Croatian forces had in autumn 1991) would have taken this complicity a step 
further: temporarily-enlisted civilian musicians would of course have been legally considered 
combatants during their service, affecting how the laws of war applied to them. 
The potential for musicians on active service to be targeted as musicians may have been a 
reason for limiting their presence on front lines. The punk musician Satan Panonski 
volunteered for the Croatian Army when fighting broke out near his hometown, and was 
killed in January 1992. A number of musicians who remained civilians were also directly 
affected by fighting, including Tereza Kesovija, a singer from Konavle near Dubrovnik, who 
frequently claimed her home had been singled out for looting because of her celebrity status. 
Musicians who remained in besieged Sarajevo were caught up, like other residents, in the 
siege, though could have greater access to routes out of the city if they served a publicity 
purpose for the Sarajevo government (including attending the Eurovision Song Contest). 
There are remarkably few instances of opposing forces singling out the highest-profile 
musicians as musicians in the way that, for instance, the Chilean or Syrian dictatorships 
targeted opposition singers (Victor Jara; Ibrahim Kashoush) during political repression. One 
Croatian singer, Mišo Kovač, used to claim that his teenage son, an army volunteer (who was 
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shot in Zagreb in 1992), had been murdered by his own side. There is a lack of evidence, 
however, concerning musicians who were less protected by fame, such as amateur local 
singers who might have been targeted in ethnic cleansing operations that were intended to 
eliminate the prominent figures in a community. 
 
The weapon-of-war discourse after conflict 
 
For Croatia, the armed phase of ethnopolitical conflict ended with the Storm (Oluja)  
operation in August 1995; under the terms of the post-war settlement, it was January 1998 
before former Serb-occupied territories in Eastern Slavonia were fully reintegrated into the 
Croatian state. In the post-war period, a broadcasting policy aimed at reinforcing popular 
music’s ethnic-boundary-marking function by excluding symbols of Serbian/Balkan identity 
continued to be applied as it had been since 1993: producers experimented with various ways 
to apply it, and less desirable music was excluded as ‘too Serbian’ or ‘too eastern’. After an 
initial phase during the acceleration of the Croat/Serb conflict in 1991 when broadcasters 
removed Serbian music from their audio libraries, the exclusion of Serbianness/easternness 
was more a performative process than a material act, and was achieved through repeated 
interaction between journalists and musicians/composers staged in the showbusiness press. 
Interviewees in these features might criticise the ‘easternness’ of a competing style of music 
on the Croatian entertainment market, or might be asked about allegations of ‘eastern 
rhythms/elements’ in their own music so that they could reject them.43 
Alongside the use of music to define the Other symbolically, the discourse of music as a 
weapon of war continued to be visible in post-war debates about whether popular music from 
elsewhere in former Yugoslavia should have any presence in sovereign Croatia. The target of 
the discourse, however, was very different from the my-song-is-my-weapon discourse that 
had characterized Croatian public representations of music and conflict during the war years. 
After 1995, its focus was reversed: what now mattered most was the idea that the Other had 
used music as a weapon of war, and therefore that the music of the Other was not appropriate 
for performance or hearing within the nation-state. The idea that music could be a weapon 
was still accepted, but the weapon was now imagined as having been held by the other side. 
After the war, establishing that the Other had used music as a weapon and that the Other’s 
aggression had been barbaric carried one of two implications: either that ‘we’ had not used 
music that way, or that, when ‘we’ had done it, it had not been aggression. With ample 
evidence of music being used to support Croatian military objectives through morale visits, 
fundraising concerts and loudspeaker harassment of enemy troops, music had instead to be 
constructed as not-aggression by appealing to Croatia’s collective narrative of justified 
defence. Simultaneously, claiming that the Other had used music aggressively served as a 
justification for excluding it and its performers from sovereign Croatia, through two recurrent 
discursive strategies: a) the discourse that hearing Serbian music would ‘offend’ those 
(Croats) who had suffered in the war,
44 
and b) the discourse that Serb musicians must accept 
that Serbia had been the aggressor before they could be suitable to perform in Croatia again. 
For instance, the director of Croatia Records, Miroslav Lilić, had stated in 1996 that Dorde 
Balašević (an anti-Milošević singer-songwriter) was the most suitable Serbian musician to 
perform in Croatia but that he ‘must recognize and accept that Serbia was the aggressor and 
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that we were defending our homes’ before he could do so45 – in other words, that he could 
not be part of Croatian musical life until he accepted the dominant Croatian public narrative 
of the conflict. 
The purpose of these discursive strategies becomes clear when one observes that the music 
they targeted was not the same music that had been most directly involved in violence. The 
Serbian songs cited in prisoner testimonies of forced singing came from the Serbian patriotic 
repertoire: the royalist national anthem, World War II Četnik songs, and songs celebrating or 
derived from the Serbian military experience of World War I and the 1912–13 Balkan Wars. 
These had become so intimately connected with violence against Croatia and against non- 
Serbs that their absence from Croatian public life was commonsensical. The discourse of the 
Other’s music as a weapon of war was instead deployed against Serbian popular music from 
before and after the war (including music by musicians such as Balašević who had resisted  
the war) and against ‘eastern’-sounding folk music in general, whether or not it was actually 
Serbian. This net swept up even musicians such as Balašević who had resisted the war. His 
songs during the war had included ‘Čovek sa mesecom u očima’ (‘The man with the moon in 
his eyes’), which depicted the guilt of a Serbian soldier involved in the capture of Vukovar, 
and ‘Krivi smo mi’ (‘We are guilty’), a message of despair that the Serb public to which 
Balašević belonged had not done more to prevent the rise of Milošević: written in 1993, these 
would surely have fulfilled the test that Lilić was still stating Balašević had not yet met in 
1996. The over-extension of the discourse of music as a Serbian weapon of war appeared to 
aim to consolidate the Croatian state’s gains in the ethnopolitical conflict by preventing any 
new shared cultural space from coalescing. Cultural policy therefore supported and confirmed 
Croatia’s strategic policy and, if successful, would have the long-term effect of preventing  
any future claim by Serbia to the same territory. 
The leading proponent of this discourse in the aftermath of the war was the head of the 
Croatian Musicians’ Union (HGU), Paolo Sfeci. Sfeci had played in new-wave rock bands 
during the 1980s before moving into music administration. Under his leadership, HGU was 
known for preventing Serbian musicians performing in Croatia and impeding Croatian 
musicians from collaborating with Serbian colleagues or transferring their music into Croatia. 
While economic protectionism is in the nature of musicians’ unions,46 Sfeci’s public 
statements were structured by and operated to support presidential/ethnopolitical discourse in 
four ways: a) the essentialist and collectivizing implication that anything or anyone Serb was 
implicated in the violence; b) the argument that Serb music and culture had been forcibly 
imposed on Croatia under Yugoslavia and should therefore be rejected now; c) the criterion 
that wartime victimhood morally outweighed any other claim to judge the situation; d) the 
attempt to represent these viewpoints as commonsensical. Sfeci famously prevented Croatian 
rock bands from performing in Slovenia alongside one of Serbia’s most famous bands, 
Partibrejkers, and sanctioned another Croatian band for playing songs by another Serbian 
band, Ekatarina Velika, at a book-launch in Zagreb. Partibrejkers and Ekatarina Velika had 
both participated in anti-war demonstrations in Belgrade in 1992 and recorded the well- 
known protest song ‘Mir, brate, mir’ (‘Peace, brother, peace’) together, yet this did not 
suffice: Sfeci was mocked by Croatia’s alternative press for years after stating in 1995 that 
‘we’re still in a state of war and nobody can guarantee that some of those musicians [in 
Partibrejkers] weren’t mobilized and might not have been shooting Vukovar up’.47 His 
comments on the book-launch incident likewise implied that anti-war activism was not 
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enough to exonerate Serbs from culpability: ‘I personally think that at a time when there are 
thousands of displaced persons walking around Zagreb whose houses the Serbs burned down, 
we can’t behave like that. Being against Milošević, and perhaps for Drašković [a nationalist 
politician opposed to Milošević] – isn’t really a [good] argument’.48 
After another incident in 1996 when some concert-goers in Zagreb had attacked a Bosnian, 
partly-Zagreb-based band (Zabranjeno Pušenje) for playing a Macedonian folk tune, Sfeci 
made clear that his ascription of Otherness went beyond Serbian nationality to take in a wider 
definition of eastern-and-therefore-Serbian culture. Sfeci appeared to support the attackers 
rather than the musicians in stating that the audience had ‘shown there was no place for the 
eastern melos [i.e. sound] in Croatia’.49 Further comments confirmed that he represented the 
type of music as the source of threat and any consequent audience violence as an 
understandable reaction: ‘Just imagine what a hand grenade [thrown] into a full auditorium 
could do’.50 HGU’s powers to advise the Interior Ministry on issuing work-permits to foreign 
musicians gave the union structural as well as discursive power. Sfeci had not exercised them 
in 1996 against Zabranjeno Pušenje, though stated that he could have done.51 He did exercise 
them against a much more symbolic star, Lepa Brena (who visited Zagreb privately in 1998 
and was invited on stage by the house band during a restaurant meal), by reporting her to the 
work and welfare ministry for performing illegally on a tourist visa.
52
 
Instances of this discourse noticeably declined after Tudman’s death and the fall of his 
government in 2000. It persisted as a means of objecting to pop-folk nightclubs and 
performances by foreign musicians constructed as Serbian, as in the 2009–10 protests against 
Brena’s concerts.53 A veterans’ representative on a 2007 Croatian talk-show objecting to a 
proposed pop-folk concert in Zagreb made the point that Serb soldiers had played the same 
genre of music on loudspeakers when entering Vukovar, and he singled out Nada Topčagić 
(who had not been advertised as performing in Zagreb). The concert was cancelled the next 
day. In general, however, reception studies from the mid-2000s suggest that the music-of-the- 
Other-as-weapon discourse may have had a limited long-term effect even in the case of a 
musician who was closely connected to violence, the Serbian pop-folk vocalist Ceca 
Ražnatović. Ražnatović married Željko Ražnatović-Arkan, the commander of the Tigers 
paramilitary unit, in 1995 and has largely been represented in Croatian media as ‘the widow  
of the war criminal Arkan’ rather than as a showbusiness figure. 
After Arkan’s death, Ceca inherited the business interests he had built up as the leader of a 
paramilitary–criminal group that had committed ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Kosovo. Besides her participation in activities designed to raise military and 
civilian morale and her frequent praise for Arkan as ‘the greatest Serbian war commander’ 
after his death in 2000, she could thus personally have been seen to profit from wealth 
accumulated during the conflict. A study of young Slovenian and Croatian women’s  
responses to Ceca nonetheless showed that these listeners and viewers at least considered her 
‘an object of admiring identification and a powerful role model’ of strategies for achieving 
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their consumer and romantic objectives in a context of regional socioeconomic crisis.
54 
The 
otherness she represented was one of a Balkan ‘joyful life, authenticity, emotionalism, 
passion, enjoyment, and craziness’ rather than the enemy otherness assigned to her by 
Croatian/Slovenian media.
55 
Volčič and Erjavec argue that these identifications with 
Ražnatović’s celebrity depend on ‘a disavowal of Ceca’s nationalistic discourse and her 
connections to politics’ that exemplifies ‘politicization fatigue’ in the post-socialist Western 
Balkans.
56 
Nonetheless, it is also clear that constant media representations of Ceca as an 
enemy representative have not prevented these respondents – who, importantly, did not 
include any who identified ethnically as Serbs – from experiencing a kind of commonality 
with her. These identifications with Ceca may be problematic from the viewpoint of cultural 
studies but still expose the limits of the attempt to separate Croatia from its ethnic Others: if 
members of this generation have not been convinced to see Ceca’s people and Ceca herself as 
utterly Other, the goals of 1990s ethnic cleansing have not been fully achieved. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Music in the post-Yugoslav conflict was clearly used as a tool of ethnopolitical conflict in 
three ways: accompaniment to violence, morale-raising, and conceptual separation. The  
forced singing of ethnonationally marked songs has been recorded as a torture technique in 
many prisoner testimonies, and music playing was also used to harass enemy troops in breaks 
from combat. States, armed forces, entertainment industries and performers believed or stated 
that stars’ performances on the front line improved troop morale, implying they constituted a 
military asset. Exercising legal, economic and discursive power to break apart the common 
entertainment industry of the former state contributed to persuading the publics of the new 
nation-states that coexistence with their ‘former neighbours’ was no longer possible. All   
these methods contributed to the aims of ethnopolitical conflict by acting on morale and by 
fixing and hardening group boundaries. The discursive use of music to achieve ethnopolitical 
aims could even be described as a delayed-action weapon in that it continued to operate after 
the armed phase of conflict had ended, to the extent that it lengthened the ethnic  
differentiation process and thus reconfirmed the goals of ethnonationalist actors. In this sense, 
however, the instrument of violence was not the music itself so much as discourses about it. 
The post-war discourse that the Other had used music as a weapon of war and that the 
Other’s musicians were personally implicated in aggression had to draw its force from the 
implicit corollary that ‘our own’ use of music must have been within the bounds of the 
‘normal’. In the eyes of the Bosniak war veterans protesting against Lepa Brena’s concert, 
Brena’s visit to VRS troops represented complicity in aggression whereas equivalent  
activities by musicians who had supported their own force were normal and praiseworthy. 
The moral criterion was, of course, the different justifications for violence and armed group 
formation that these veterans’ organizations perceived, associating the VRS with Serb 
expansionist aggression and ABiH with heroic communal defence. This clash of narratives is 
one of numerous examples where ‘three broad competing versions of truth’ (one per main 
ethnonational identity) exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina and where ‘[e]ach group seeks to portray 
itself as the main victim and to minimize, to deny, or to rationalize the suffering it inflicted  
on others’;57 these discourses feed off and sometimes into events and representations in the 
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kin states. Does there therefore exist a problematic refusal to acknowledge the complicity of 
one’s ‘own’ musicians, which societies and entertainment industries must confront in order to 
achieve lasting peace? The framework of ‘denial’ often used for understanding post-conflict 
societies overlooks the fact that, as strategies, rationalization and relativization of violence 
have different functions for different contexts and speakers. Qualitative interview research in 
Serbia suggests that private individuals’ reframing of evidence of violence represents a 
‘necessary mediation’ in understanding events they cannot integrate into their existing beliefs, 
rather than an overt political act.
58 
This distinction and the processual nature of ethnic 
identity construction affects how popular music ought to be viewed in the aftermath of 
ethnopolitical conflict. 
Musicians’ complicity in ethnopolitical conflict in former Yugoslavia, unlike in Rwanda, 
has not been framed as a legal issue. Even in Rwanda, the musician charged with incitement 
to genocide (Simon Bikindi) did not end up being held responsible for his songs;
59 
jurists 
have nonetheless raised the question of whether songs by a future Bikindi should be 
punishable if the criteria of intent and causality could be proved. Robert H. Snyder, for 
instance, has argued that, where songs with potentially genocidal messages were performed 
and broadcast in juxtaposition with other genocidal speech and that the performer/composer 
had the power to prevent this, a guilty verdict would be possible.
60 
This emphasis on wider 
context is interestingly paralleled in cultural studies by Richard Dyer’s theory of the star 
persona: for Dyer, the meanings of stars lie not just in the texts they produce or appear in but 
also in a wider set of texts about them, including publicity and their off-stage behaviour.
61 
This parallel suggests that cultural studies approaches may permit innovative approaches to 
media in human rights. 
Several sets of extended criteria for proving incitement have been offered in the wake of 
the Bikindi verdict: whether the speaker used dehumanizing rhetoric during or soon after 
violence against the target group; where the speech satisfies certain prerequisites drawn from 
communications research that makes it more likely to be influential; more consideration of   
the channels of communication used, the temporal proximity of the song to violence, and how 
responsible the performer was for its dissemination at that time.
62 
This legal dimension is not 
part of the debate over media and mass violence in the post-Yugoslav conflict, despite 
widespread agreement that media played a significant role in disseminating ethnonationalist 
discourses and that popular music was implicated in this framework.
63 
Music only appears in 
the ICTY records when wielded as a weapon by non-musicians in situations that would likely 
have breached international law whether singing had been involved or not. 
Examples from the Yugoslav wars thus support the evidence from Rwanda that popular 
music must be taken seriously in understanding ethnopolitical conflict. Yet in what way 
should it be integrated into this understanding? Extensive literature on the Western Balkans 
has exposed nationalism in popular music but has not gone down the route of assigning 
responsibility for ethnic cleansing to musicians, and the ICTY, unlike the Rwanda tribunal, 
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did not put media executives on trial. Observing the post-war securitization of the Other’s 
music in former Yugoslavia suggests that indicting media or music workers would have been 
counter-productive to conflict resolution. Even as things were, the discourse of musicians as 
collectively complicit presented an obstacle to the re-emergence of a post-Yugoslav space 
containing inter-ethnically shared cultural references. For some years after 1995, musicians 
constructed as Serb who wanted to perform in Croatia were the targets of ethnically-loaded 
media representations, likewise Croatian musicians performing in Serbia; all depended on 
sympathetic venue owners in order to be able to play.
64 
Their activity would have been much 
more difficult if they had also been subject to potential legal consequences, such as fear of 
indictment or arrest on entering the territory of a former enemy state. The potential to use 
incitement to genocide charges against musicians might well have been used after the conflict 
to target a wider range of ethnically Other musicians, impede the re-establishment of cultural 
connections and thus accentuate the gains of ethnic cleansing. 
Music is evidently significant in ethnopolitical conflict; there are, however, three major 
drawbacks to viewing it through purely a legal lens. It is clear that, during the post-Yugoslav 
wars, musicians as a professional group were incorporated into state media systems and 
participated in patriotic initiatives, singing songs that to greater or lesser extents expressed  
the dominant and ethnocentric collective narrative of the conflict. However, accusing all 
musicians of professional complicity removes their agency and loses sense of the contests for 
discursive power that took place on different sides of the conflict. Though the early wartime 
discourses of pluralistically defending Croatia or Bosnia became overpowered by 
ethnonationalism, they were still meaningful to many volunteers, including musicians, who 
lent their civilian or military support to an ethnonationalist armed force. A second drawback, 
pointed out for Rwanda, is that ‘benevolent censorship’ of ethnocentric music – such as that 
exercised over news by NATO in Bosnia in 1997 – ‘run[s] the risk of concretizing an uneven 
global standard for who may control “free speech”, as well as how and when’ is equally 
important here.
65 
A third objection can also be made relating to the specific goals of 
ethnopolitical conflict and ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing aims to produce homogenous 
ethnic populations that are territorially separated and – when this strategy is viewed from a 
post-structuralist perspective – have been and are being fixed in their identities as groups. To 
avoid reconfirming the gains of ethnic cleansing, conflict resolution therefore needs to 
encourage ‘interethnic contact rather than separation’ and resist the frames that perpetrators  
of ethnic cleansing have imposed.
66 
Ascribing musicians a collective complicity in 
ethnopolitical conflict would have detrimental effects on the survival and transformation of 
the shared cultural and everyday connections that popular music had facilitated before the 
conflict. If the concept of music as a weapon of war has damaging implications in 
ethnopolitical conflict, the discourse that the Other has used music as a weapon is also 
damaging. As seen in the post-Yugoslav example, it produces separation and interferes with 
the recoalescence of a common (though fragmented) cultural space. Instead, what is required 
is a perspective on music in ethnopolitical conflict that recognizes the significance of music  
in the everyday, appreciates that a goal of ethnopolitical conflict is the fundamental revision 
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of social relations, and is grounded in an understanding of ethnicity and identity as processual, 
contingent and contested. 
